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A Boy Seaman in the 
King’s Service
William Miles, RN CVR
E R I C  B R O W N
Abstract: During the First World War, more than 3,700 men served with 
the Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve. A number of them were boy 
seamen, boys under the age of 18 who enlisted with their parents’ consent. 
However, there were also boys who enlisted while under age by using false 
birth dates or assumed names. Enlistment was easy if  one did not get caught. 
The problem of underaged enlistments became serious enough to compel the 
Naval Service of Canada to seek opinions on the legality of retaining these 
enlistees in the service. This article is the tale of an underaged Ottawa boy 
who was found out and the efforts of his parent to get him out of the navy.
Resume : Pendant la Premiere Guerre mondiale, plus de 3 700 hommes 
ont servidans la Reserve de volontaires canadiens de la marine royale. Un 
certain nombrede ces hommes etaient de jeunes matelots, de jeunes gargons 
de moins de 18 ansqui s ’enrolaient avec le consentement de leurs parents. 
Neanmoins, certainsjeunes gargons de moins de 18 ans s ’enrolaient aussi 
en utilisant de faussesdates de naissance ou de faux noms. L ’enrolement 
etait facile, mais il nefallait pas se faire prendre. L ’enrolement de personnes 
mineures est devenuassez grave pour pousser le Service naval du Canada 
a obtenir des avis sur lalegalite de conserver ces recrues en service. Cet 
article est le recit d ’unjeune homme mineur d ’Ottawa dont on a decouvert 
la supercherie ainsi que desefforts de ses parents pour le sortir de la marine.
In  A u g u s t  1917, William Miles, a 16-year-old boy from Ottawa, enlisted in the Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve (r n c v r ). 
He knew he was too young to join without his father’s consent so he 
created a new identity, becoming John Henry Henderson, born on 1
© Canadian Military History 23, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 111- 120.
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Ten men in civilian clothing moments before enlisting into the Royal Canadian Navy. [Canadian 
War Museum 20030174-024]
September 1899. For a period of about four weeks after enlisting, his 
widower father, John Miles, had no idea of his whereabouts. After 
learning that William was in the navy under an assumed name, he 
attempted to have his son released. This article will examine how the 
navy dealt with Mr. Miles’ efforts.
John Henderson’s “Application To Be Enrolled In The Royal 
Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve”1 indicated his home was in 
Kingston, Ontario, and he was employed as a machinist. Standing 
5 feet, 3% inches tall, John was of less than average height but of 
normal build for his age.2 The examining medical officer (m o ) passed 
Henderson as “fit” but noted he was “Somewhat under standard, but 
will improve.”3 The m o  did not elaborate, but seems to suggest that, 
while John was not a robust boy, he would become stronger given
1 The RNCVR was established by an Order in Council in May 1914. The name 
was officialy changed to the RCNVR in January 1923. See G.N. Tucker, The Naval 
Service of Canada, vol.1 (Ottawa: The King’s Printer, 1952), 158-9, 338.
2 “Application To Be Enrolled In The Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve - 
John Henry Henderson, 10 August 1917.” Library and Archives Canada [LAC] RG24 
1992/93/169 135. (Note: all references are from this file unless indicated.)
3 Ibid.
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Nine sailors moments after enlisting into the Royal Canadian Navy. [Canadian War Museum 
20030174-025]
time. Deemed fit, John Henderson was enrolled “as Boy for stokers 
[sic] duties on attaining the age of 18 years,” to serve “for the period 
of the war” in the Atlantic Sub-Division of the r n c v r .4 His training 
would begin at h m c s  Niobe in Halifax.4 5
Youths 17 years of age and younger were enlisted in the r n c v r  as 
a “boy,” the lowest rank in the navy. On reaching their 18th birthday 
they were rated as an “ordinary seaman.” Boys, who were paid 50 
cents per day, were in effect apprentice seamen.6
We know nothing of William’s interests, experiences or education 
before he ran away from home to join the navy. Was it family 
circumstances or the draw of the excitement he imagined existed at 
this time? He likely would have known about Boy 1st Class John
4 Ibid.
5 HMCS Niobe, an 11,000 ton Diadem class cruiser, was built in the UK and 
commissioned into the RCN in 1910. The ship was nearly lost in 1911 in a grounding 
incident. She was used as a depot ship at Halifax and suffered damage during the 
Halifax explosion on 6 December 1917. Niobe was paid off in 1920 and scrapped in 
1922. < www.readyayeready.com>, accessed 30 June 2013.
6 Statement of Account John Miles, alias Henderson, Boy, RCNVR VR 4752, From 
11th Aug. 17-24th Jan. 18.
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Cornwell of the Royal Navy, who was mortally wounded while serving 
on a gun crew aboard h m s  Chester during the Battle of Jutland on 31 
May 1916. Most of his gun crew lay about him dead or wounded, but 
Cornwell stayed at his post awaiting orders. He died in hospital two 
days later. His mother was presented with his posthumous Victoria 
Cross by King George V  in September 1916.7 This story of courage 
could not fail to inspire patriotic fervour in young men.
Nothing is on record regarding William learning his bogus 
identity had been exposed or the response to his father’s attempts 
to get him out of the navy. Mr. Miles probably learned of the 
scheme from his oldest son John, a Canadian Expeditionary Force 
artilleryman stationed in England. When William put the name of 
John Henderson on his enlistment application, he indicated that his 
“brother,” Gunner T. Henderson, regimental number 319882, was the 
next-of-kin. A  search of the Library and Archives “Soldiers of the 
First World War” database did not disclose such a person, however 
a further search matched the regimental number to Gunner John 
Miles.8 This was William’s real brother. It is likely William wrote to 
his older brother after enrolment to explain the scheme and the use 
of false names, and Gunner John then wrote home to their father 
and exposed his little brother’s deceit. Mr. Miles was undoubtedly 
relieved to know, at last, what had happened to his son and where he 
was, and he wanted him back home.
For help in getting his son out of the navy, Mr. Miles turned to 
the Member of Parliament (m p ) who represented his constituency in 
the city of Ottawa, Mr. Alfred Fripp. After hearing Mr. Miles’ story, 
Fripp agreed to try and have William released. This resulted in an 
exchange of letters, starting with the deputy minister of the Navy 
Department,9 George Desbarats, eventually reaching the minister, 
Charles Ballantyne. The M P ’s first letter, written on 17 September 
1917, to Desbarats pointed out that John Henry Henderson was really 
William Miles and he was only 16 years of age, not 17 as claimed.10
7 John “Jack” Cornwell, Boy VC. < http://www.royalnavalmuseum.org/info_ 
sheets_johncornwell.htm>, accessed 7 July 2013.
8 “Attestation Paper -  John Miles, 7 February 1916,” < www.collectionscanada. 
gc.ca/databases/cef/001042-110.02>, accessed 19 May 2013.
9 The Department of the Naval Service (often referred to as the Navy Department) 
came into existence through the Naval Service Bill of January 1910. The department 
was under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Marine and Fisheries.
10 A.E. Fripp to JG Desbarats, 17 September 1917.
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Canada’s first Naval recruits, November 1910, eleven members o f the HM CS Niobe. [Canadian 
War Museum 20030174-024]
Fripp ended his letter by stating, “His father asks that he be returned 
home. Will you kindly have this done and oblige.”11
Desbarats replied within a few days, pointing out that “the 
boy has committed an offence, apparently by making a wilful false 
statement when signing his enrolment form.”12 The deputy minister 
wanted to see William’s birth certificate before taking any action. 
About five weeks later Fripp wrote to Minister Ballantyne. His letter 
of 29 October undoubtedly made the same arguments that had been 
presented to the ministry many times since the war began by parents 
trying to retrieve wayward sons: William “was induced to enlist” by 
persons unnamed, his father “wish[ed] to have his son home,” and “ [t] 
he father had already given one boy who is now in France with our 
troops.”13
Minister Ballantyne would not release William and on 8 November 
wrote to Fripp to explain his decision:
... a considerable number of boys have made false statements on 
enlistment as regards their age, and as a result the opinion of the
11 Ibid.
12 Desbarats to Fripp, 20 September 1917.
13 Fripp to CC Ballantyne, 29 October 1917.
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Department of Justice was asked as to whether in such cases the boys 
themselves or their parents had any claim for their discharge. In reply, 
the Department of Justice have informed me that neither the boys nor 
the parents have any claim whatsoever ... it has been necessary to refuse 
to release them, merely on the grounds that they deliberately made false 
statements on enlistment. Unless there are very strong reasons for the 
discharge of the boy about whom you write, I am afraid it will not be 
possible to release him.14
Although the likelihood of having William released was small, it 
might have made a difference had the minister been acquainted with 
the whole story of Mr. Miles’ circumstances. This did not happen 
until Fripp wrote again to Ballantyne on 13 November 1917, pointing 
out that Mr. Miles was a widower raising “some small children,”15 
and that he “is only a Conductor on the Street Railway ... anxious 
to get the boy home, and is willing, out of his wages to pay any 
expenses for his return to Ottawa.”16 He also enclosed a certified 
copy of the baptismal certificate, signed by the priest of St. Brigid’s 
Church, Ottawa, showing that William was born on “the sixth day 
of May nineteen hundred and one.”17 Why Fripp did not make any 
reference to the minister’s decision of 8 November is a puzzle, for 
that letter should have settled the matter.
The minister replied on 19 November, returning the certificate 
“of John Henry Henderson alias William Miles”18 without comment 
and reaffirmed his decision that he was “unable to authorize the boy’s 
discharge from the service.”19 Young Miles, alias Henderson, was in 
the r n c v r  for the duration.
Early December found Miles aboard h m c s  Shearwater bound 
for Bermuda.20 The island had long been the major Royal Navy [r n ] 
establishment in the Western Hemisphere and, for Canada’s navy, an
14 Ballantyne to Fripp, 8 November 1917.
15 Fripp to Ballantyne, 13 November 1917.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ballantyne to Fripp, 19 November 1917.
19 Ibid.
20 HMCS Shearwater, a steel-hulled sloop built in the UK. Commissioned as HMS 
Shearwater in 1910. She was based at Esquimalt, BC for a number of years before 
being transferred to the RCN in 1915 and utilised as a submarine tender. The sloop 
was transferred to Halifax in 1917. Paid off in 1919. < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
HMS_Shearwater_(190o)>, accessed 7 July 2013.
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ideal place to train seamen away from the winter gales of the North 
Atlantic. Crews were billetted ashore in the Casemate Barracks, 
with training afloat was usually conducted under the tutelage of r n  
instructors.21
h m s  Caesar, a pre-war Dreadnought, was based at the dockyard 
for use as a gunnery training and patrol ship.22 Miles was at sea 
aboard this ship when, on 11 January 1918, he reported to the 
sick bay. According to the report of the Fleet Surgeon, he initially 
responded well to treatment for “some swelling in region of the right 
ankle joint. No pyrexia [fever].”23 A fever developed within a few 
days, as did a heart murmur. Miles was admitted to the r n  hospital 
in the dockyard on 21 January where “malignant endocarditis” was 
diagnosed.24 He died of heart failure three days later, at the age of 16.
It took five days, until 29 January, for the news of William’s 
death to reach Mr. Miles.25 He turned to Fripp that same day asking 
if arrangements could be made for William’s body to be returned 
to Ottawa at government expense. Mr. Miles also called upon the 
naval secretary in person to press his request, but was told William 
was buried the day following his death. “The funeral took place on 
January 25th, HMS Caesar providing firing party, guns crew and 
band, and all boys from CASEM ATE B A R R A C K S attending.”26 
In any case, the department only allowed $100 for burial and this 
included transportation. Exhumation and transportation costs would 
certainly have exceeded this amount.
The final word on this matter came from the director of the naval 
service, Admiral Sir Charles Kingsmill. Written on 30 January, likely 
in response to a query from the minister, the admiral summarized 
the situation over the preceeding five months and, with respect to 
bringing William’s body home, concluded “I do not consider this is 
a case in which the Government should bear the expense for a mere 
matter of sentiment.”27 There was also the unspoken concern of setting
21 See Ian Strannick, The Andrew and The Onions: The Story of the Royal Navy in 
Bermuda 1795-1975 (Bermuda: The Island Press, n.d.).
22 HMS Caesar -  <http : //www.forces-war-records.co.uk/Unit-Info/965>, accessed 
9 April 2013.
23 Lieutenant H.W. Pearse’s Fleet Surgeon’s Report -  John Henry Henderson. n.d.
24 Ibid. Endocarditis is described as an “inflamation of the membrane lining the 
heart.” See Oxford English Dictionary.
25 Telegram: Dominion London to Naval Ottawa, 28 January 1918.
26 Commander, HMCS Shearwater letter to The Secretary, Ottawa, 30 January 1918.
27 Kingsmill’s Memorandum for the Minister, 30 January 1918.
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The final resting place o f William Miles, also known as 'John Henderson,' in Bermuda Royal 
Naval Cemetery. [The War Graves Photographic Project]
a precedent. Granting this request would inevitably become widely 
known and could unleash a wave of correspondence from bereaved 
families wanting to bring home their dead fathers, husbands, and 
sons, and they were already counted in the tens of thousands on the 
Western Front alone.
Fripp had also asked the minister, in his 29 January letter, “How 
the Medical Officer could have passed this boy is a pertinent question 
when he is officially reported to have died of heart disease.”28 There 
is no record of a response. The m o  who examined William was of the 
“opinion that he is fit.”29 But, as he was “under standard,” should 
he have been rejected? The form does not require the examiner to 
explain this comment, unless the recruit is unfit. It could be that 
Mr. Miles knew his youngest son was really not medically suitable 
but could offer no documentary evidence to the navy to support his 
concerns. On the other hand, William’s strong desire to enlist might 
have overcome any of the m o ’ s reservations.
There now remained the settling of the young sailor’s estate. It 
consisted of three letters and 21 cents in Canadian postage stamps.
28 Fripp to Ballantyne, 29 January 1918.
29 Application to be Enrolled, Section (C) Medical Officer’s Certificate.
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The headstone o f William Miles, also 
known as 'John Henderson,' in Bermuda 
Royal Naval Cemetery. [The War Graves 
Photographic Project]
His kit, “it being Government property,” was returned to h m c s  
Shearwater.30 A letter was sent to Mr. Miles by the chief accountant 
of the Navy Department on 1 March 1918, closing William’s pay 
account: “With reference to the estate of the late John Henry 
Henderson alias Wm. Miles, Boy, V.R. 4752, I have to enclose herewith 
Official Cheque ... for Seventy-Three Dollars and Twenty-Six cents 
... being payment in full of the amount due by this Department to 
the estate.”31
“J.H Henderson served as Boy W. Miles, Royal Naval Canadian 
Volunteer Reserve” and is interred in the Royal Navy Cemetery, 
Ireland Island, Bermuda, grave number 103.32 The assumed name 
is recorded in the Book of Remembrance which can be seen at the 
Centre Block of the Parliament Buildings in Ottawa. He served his 
King and Empire for 167 days. It is regrettable that at his death the 
navy did not set the record straight and put the proper name on the 
head stone.
30 Department of the Naval Service, form S442, and Account of the Sale of the 
Effects. 14 February 1918.
31 Chief Accountant’s letter to Mr. John Miles, 1 March 1918.
32 Letter to The Deputy Minister of the Naval Service, Ottawa, 31 December 1919.
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One could posit that the Miles family was treated rather harshly 
and unsympathetically by the navy during William’s short career. 
However, taking into account that the war was not yet won and that 
policies for dealing with underage and bogus enlistments were already 
well established, we can conclude that the family’s treatment was 
not exceptional in any sense. As for William, he was simply another 
young sailor anxious to do his duty.33
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Eric Brown worked for the federal government for 35 years. Since his 
retirement he has obtained a b a  (Honours) in history from Carleton 
University and for the past 18 years has been a volunteer at the Canadian 
W ar Museum.
33 For a more enlightened policy towards underaged enlistment, see Tim Cook, “He 
Was Determined to go : Underaged Soldiers in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 
Histoire sociale/Social History 41 (2008), 41-74.
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Promotion Struck Him 
as Mysterious
Major-General A. Bruce Matthews Interviewed
J. L.  G R A N A T S T E I N
Abstract: Bruce Matthews was a militia artilleryman who finished the 
Second World War in command of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division. 
This transcript of a series of interviews conducted by J.L . Granatstein in 
1991 contains Matthews’ views on a wide range of issues related to the 
Canadian army in the Second World War including his candid comments on 
A.G .L. McNaughton, H.D.G. Crerar, G.G. Simonds, and H.L.N. Salmon, 
as well as various other senior commanders he worked with during the war.
Resume : Bruce Matthews etait un artilleur de la milice qui a termine 
la Seconde Guerre mondiale au commandement de la 2e Division de 
l ’infanterie canadienne. Cette transcription d ’une serie d ’entrevues menees 
par J.L. Granatstein en 1991 contient le point de vue de Bruce Matthews 
sur un large eventail de questionsliees a l ’armee canadienne pendant la 
Seconde Guerre mondiale, notamment ses francs commentaires sur A.G.L. 
McNaughton, H.D.G. Crerar, G.G. Simonds et H.L.N. Salmon, ainsi que 
sur d ’autres commandants superieurs avec lesquels il atravaille pendant la 
guerre.
B r u c e  Ma t t h e w s  w a s  a militia artilleryman who finished the Second World War in command of the 2nd Canadian Division. 
He was born to money in 1909, went to private schools, and worked 
for his father’s brokerage firm during the Depression. But his true 
interest was the Militia, and he was one of the very good artillerymen 
produced out of the pre-war force.
© Canadian Military History 23, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 121- 130.
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I interviewed him in his Toronto condominium on 25 April and 
10 June 1991, and I also had one telephone conversation with him. 
The three talks have been amalgamated here to make the text run 
roughly chronologically. Minor excisions and corrections have been 
made, but the original memoranda are in my papers at the York 
University Archives and at the Directorate of History and Heritage 
at National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa.
A robust man during the war, Matthews was very thin and 
clearly not well when he spoke to me, and he died in September 
1991, three months after our last interview. The one truly striking 
point he made -  one that brought home to me what the war did to 
the families of those that served -  was that when he came back to 
Canada more than five years after he had last been with his wife, one 
of the twin sons he had never seen said, “Mommy, who is that man?” 
I remember weeping when I typed up my interview memorandum, 
and this utterly poignant remark makes me tear up still.
We met at his apartment, and Matthews began by talking of his 
early youth. He described himself as a dropout. He spent ten years at 
Upper Canada College then applied for the Royal Military College in 
1926-7 but failed the entrance exams, though narrowly. He was urged 
to sit them again, but refused and went to Europe, taking French 
lessons in Switzerland and sitting in on lectures at Geneva. Then it 
was back to Canada and into business with his father’s brokerage 
firm. [His father became lieutenant-governor of Ontario in 1937 and 
held the post until 1946.] He worked in New York City in 1929-30 
and was supposed to go to London, but came home because of the 
depression. Matthews then passed his time in the militia almost as a 
hobby; but he’d wanted to be in the service. He had, he said, wanted 
to join the naval reserve but when he was turned down for colour 
blindness, a neighbour, adjutant of an artillery regiment, hooked him 
instead. He found he could do reasonably well here, took the long 
course at Kingston...
He was in the artillery militia [30th Field Battery] in Toronto. 
The unit was terribly understrength and many men and all officers 
assigned their pay to the regiment. As it was, regimental funds had 
to be used to buy boots for the unit during the Depression when d n d
12
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couldn’t provide them. Militia was time consuming -  at least one 
night a week normally and an extra night or two if teaching a course 
or doing one. There was, he thought, good work done on theoretical 
training and at camp, though ammunition was short and one year 
there were literally no rounds to fire. Things began to change about 
1938 when he commanded the 15th Field Battery, with Military 
District No.2 becoming more attentive to the unit. The practice 
camps in 1938 and 1939 were well conducted with good instructors 
who put them through their paces. He enjoyed Permanent Force [p f ] 
officers’ company after hours and there was a lot of talk about his 
unit’s potential. There was, however, some tension between p f  and 
militia, though less so in artillery than other corps. “They embraced 
us.” Gunners stuck together, he said. There were a lot of gunner 
generals, so many that others complained of the “gunners’ union.”
He saw a lot of p f  instructors : C.F. Constantine, Guy Simonds, 
H.O.N. Brownfield, Titus Evans, the Andersons. He did the long 
course at Kingston to qualify as a 1st Lieutenant and lived in quarters 
for a couple of months and thus got to know the artillery P F ers there. 
He also did the militia staff course which he thought gave him a good 
sense of appreciations, orders, staff duties. The p f  officers who taught 
this course, on 1 or 2 nights a week, were good, and he thinks were 
p s c  s [i.e., had passed Staff College].
He did add that there was some grumbling in the Armoured 
Corps at P F ers, perhaps because it was new. He himself served under 
Brownfield and R.J. Leach, both p f  officers from the Royal Canadian 
Horse Artillery without problem. There was a problem in the p f  itself 
about promotion.
He met his wife in Toronto, though she was an American. Her 
mother was Canadian, her sister had married a Canadian, and she 
was visiting her sister. They married in 1937. And she came to the 
UK in 1940 to be with him. As an American, she was forbidden to 
travel, but his father, the lieutenant-governor, arranged a passport for 
her in 48 hours, and she came over. She had left one child at home, 
and returned in August 1940 when London laid down rules. After 
her return in 1941 she had twins, and acquaintances gossiped and 
counted months, not knowing she had been in the UK. Matthews did 
not get back to Canada for the entire six years of war; every time he 
was scheduled to return he would be promoted or posted. And when 
he did get back in late 1945, one of his twins, then over four, said, 
“Mommy, who is that man?”
13
: A Boy Seaman in the King’s Service William Miles, RNCVR
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
Promotion struck him as mysterious. The Military Secretary in 
Ottawa and Canadian Military Headquarters in London moved in 
strange ways, and other than seniority he didn’t know how it worked. 
He spent some time with Brownfield who was the first Commander 
Royal Artillery [c r a ] and they talked about people ; those with 
adverse comments on file went back to Canada. The problem was the 
huge expansion, the scramble for talent. There was experimentation 
and many failed.
As for himself, he had come into the militia after taking the 
long course, and he was promoted reasonably quickly to captain. He 
served as adjutant of his unit, the 7th Regiment, and his unit was 
mobilized in September 1939 -  a tribute to its results at camp and 
in competition and to its very near complete strength. It was also 
for geography, but based on some crude assessments of readiness. He 
thought there were differences between Toronto and Prairie-Maritime 
artillery units : sophistication. Their officers were a bit crude but 
competent -  he called his a schoolboy attitude -  and there was no 
fraternization for a time. But [overseas] postings broke this down. He 
agreed there was an element of snobbery here, of class.
In the UK his battery and another merged and he was left over; 
he thought he might get sent home, but instead he was posted to 
the 1st Medium Regiment ; in 1941 when a new Medium Regiment, 
the 5th, was formed General A.G.L. McNaughton called him in and 
offered him command. He was allowed to handpick 40 men from his 
old regiment and 40 more from another. Matthews claimed to have 
been puzzled by his rise. He obviously kept track of his rank -  he 
knew he was senior artillery major in 1941, e.g., but he never got the 
call. He wasn’t bypassed, it was just that he didn’t get a regiment 
until then.
He admitted to a certain nervousness about taking over a unit 
of that size, but more from fear of artillery accidents. As it was, the 
Brits were very helpful, friendly -  “they were damn glad to see us.” 
He did say that his regiment initially had steel-wheeled 60-pounders, 
but they devised a way of carrying them on tank transporters and 
found they could get into action almost as quickly as rubber-tired 
guns. He worried too about the lack of opportunity to train with 
other arms, and when exercises of that sort began he was frustrated 
that the other units weren’t ready. Later as a Counter-Battery Officer 
[of I Canadian Corps, 1942-43], he roamed around as eyes and ears 
for the Commander Corps Royal Artillery [c c r a ], he being under-
14
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Major-General A. Bruce Matthews.
[Library and Archives Canada PA 138399]
employed, and found that some artillery regiments were slack -  no 
pickets etc. This suggested the truth of complaints about the training 
standard.
He described [g o c  1st Canadian Division Major-General H.L.N.] 
Salmon as a conventional commander, no innovator. He wasn’t easy 
to serve under, though he was pleasant enough. But he wasn’t always 
clear in training in giving his instructions, and it was hard for officers 
to know what to do. Still, even if he was no Simonds, he knew his way 
around. He remembers a Monty order for all officers to do physical 
training (p t ) for 30 minutes per day and Salmon always arriving 
late for the h q  exercises -  the awkward squad. In his own medium 
regiment there was vigorous p t  five days a week.
McNaughton, he said, was revered the first year, especially by 
gunners. But his charm diminished considerably. He used to hear 
senior people bemoaning him. Andy was a dragon about equipment 
and could be found under a vehicle. He literally remembered going 
to a conference at Corps and finding McNaughton under a truck, 
looking for the source of transmission problems. But he had a difficult 
role -  Cabinet orders to keep Canada first. He wasn’t an eloquent
15
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man and didn’t try to persuade the Brits of this -  he would just say 
these are my orders. There was a sense about him of refighting World 
War I, and General Brooke [the Chief of the Imperial General Staff] 
and Monty found him tiresome, lacking in spirit and drive.
In Sicily and Italy [where he was c r a  of 1st Canadian Division 
in the rank of brigadier], Matthews admired 8th Army procedures 
where there were no frills but all were kept informed. Verbal orders 
were followed occasionally by a memo. Thus when he became c c r a  
in North West Europe [of II Canadian Corps from January 1944], he 
never had time and he had constant meetings to work out fire plans, 
but it was easy as he’d watched 8th Army operate. Other senior 
commanders had difficulty in figuring out what was wanted after a 
Corps or Army Orders Group...
He spoke of the freedom a g o c  had in Italy where they were more 
on their own. In North West Europe, however, the operations were 
so big you were just a cog, and there was little a g o c  could do about 
tactical requirements. It was a rushed, difficult atmosphere in which 
to command. After the Normandy breakthrough and after the Rhine 
crossings there were periods of relative freedom, however.
We talked about his own role as a division commander. He wasn’t 
awed by this. As a c r a  and c c r a , he had intimate relations with 
infantry and armoured commanders, watched attacks with them, and 
he knew their minds better, he thought, than they did. The turnover 
in infantry commanders was such that he’d been involved longer 
than many of them -  George Kitching, Rod Keller, Dan Spry, etc. 
(Kitching, he added, was very able and found himself caught in a 
difficult situation between the Poles and Canadians in August 1944. 
As it was, he made a good comeback after he was sacked. Matthews 
doubted that even a highly trained 4th Canadian Armoured Division 
could have done better at Falaise -  the fog of war was terrific. It 
surprised him when Kitching was sacked so quickly, but he didn’t 
think Simonds did it to save his own job. Certainly there was no 
rumour machine in operation. He felt sorry for Kitching).
Matthews had had reasonable experience in Sicily and Italy, but 
even so it was difficult to command. He gave brigadiers a free run, 
and his job was to allocate support to them. He had trouble with 
[Brigadier W.J.] Megill, the one P F er who may have resented serving 
under a militia g o c , but it was too late in the war to do anything 
about this.
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Simonds would come frequently to his h q  as would [First 
Canadian Army commander General Harry] Crerar and Monty. 
Simonds drew up the overall plan, allocating areas to his divisions. 
He’d go over Matthews’ plan, asking pointed questions. But most 
discussion/negotiation was through g s o i s  who argued over supplies, 
road use, etc. As a division commander, Matthews modelled himself 
on Simonds. He would go forward to brigades, as he was constantly 
urged to do. And when an attack was on, he’d try to go to battalions 
near the start line to sense if the company and platoon commanders 
had a grip on their objectives. The problem was that time for 
reconnaissance was never available, and as a result there were always 
mines, etc., that no one knew about. Of course, because we had air 
superiority, battalions could be trucked very close to the start lines.
His 2nd Division had had a hard time -  Dieppe and then Carpiquet 
in Normandy. Morale had dents in it. When he took over in November 
1944, he was told that the division needed careful handling and its 
morale boosted, as well as more training. Fortunately he had 6-8 
weeks to do this, and he ran company schools, training, etc. He also 
gave reassurance, reasoned with the troops, asked for questions, etc.
He tried to avoid hospital visits, something easy to do because 
evacuation was so prompt. He was appalled by the casualties, tried 
to talk to the troops about this and to assure them he was trying 
to minimize them. He talked of this with Simonds and [II Canadian 
Corps’ Chief of Staff, Brigadier N. Elliott] Rodger too -  was 
everything being done to minimize casualties? Had something gone 
seriously wrong if they were high in a particular operation? What 
made it all harder was the reinforcement situation and the cold, wet 
winter of 1944-45.
He thought Crerar was a professional, but so academic in the way 
he approached things by the book. He could be charming to talk to, 
but his Orders Groups weren’t inspiring as he monotonously outlined 
his plans. There was not much vigour there, not much aggression, 
though he wasn’t incompetent. Matthews said he didn’t resent this, 
but it was clear he was no admirer. Nor did he admire Churchill 
Mann [Crerar’s chief of staff]. There was a gap between Mann and 
the division commanders because Mann was eccentric. He seemed to 
feel he had to polish up Crerar’s plans to make them more dynamic.
Simonds lived up to his reputation. He was brusque and demanding 
but reasonable. If you said a plan wouldn’t work, he’d listen, though 
he might insist. He had a reputation for being ruthless with people,
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but Matthews saw no signs of this. As c r a  in 1st Division he was 
close to him ; of course, Simonds understood gunners’ problems. For 
example, Matthews’ Headquarters ship was sunk en route to Sicily, 
and he landed with a typewriter and a clerk. He spoke warmly of the 
way the Brits helped the Canadians learn. They gave advice with 
good grace. The armour got similar help, but the infantry, he said, 
didn’t -  it was too big. Despite the borrowed help, when the first 
divisional shoot was laid on, he had to tell Simonds that it couldn’t 
start when scheduled. “When will it be ready?” “Three hours later.” 
“Then make it so.” Simonds trusted Matthews.
Still, as a commander Simonds kept the pressure on which 
contributed to casualties and waste. He would regularly get annoyed 
at the armour which wouldn’t go far enough forward for him. He 
pioneered night armoured attacks in Normandy, and Matthews did 
the fire plan using tracers, etc. as guides. There were real problems 
with supplies, and the bridgehead was chaos; red smoke shells arrived 
only at the last minute, e.g. The real difficulty was that everything 
had to be done at once, that there was never time. For example, the 
old idea of registering artillery targets was scrapped, and they shot 
by the map -  a problem as the maps weren’t very accurate. The 
pressure, the magnitude of the operations, was unbelievable. Simonds 
was genuinely innovative, though he had limited success. At Caen, 
he had 4th Armoured Division which was semi-trained, and 2nd and 
3rd Divisions which had had a hard time.
He mentioned that after the war Simonds married the ex-wife of 
G.G. Sinclair, a lawyer, and the two of them and the Matthews went 
to Jamaica together a few times. Simonds decided to learn golf and 
spent hours practicing. He wanted to be good at anything he did, and 
his wife would ask Matthews how he’d played, knowing that there’d 
be trouble if things had gone badly. He became a good player.
Rod Keller and Chris Vokes were close friends. Matthews knew 
Vokes well but not Keller. He never felt confident that either really 
grasped things. Vokes was likeable and full of energy, but very 
nervous at times. He would ring up Matthews as c r a  in the middle of 
the night, worried about some firing. In fact he was an ideal brigade 
commander, comfortable lying in the mud looking through binoculars. 
But he didn’t meet the standards the 8th Army or Simonds wanted. 
Keller was the same, and his artillery commanders had a hard time 
with him. It was difficult to find him in action. Vokes was very
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critical of everyone from the prime minister on down and didn’t think 
much of the higher echelons.
Charles Foulkes he liked as an individual, but he wasn’t popular 
with his commanders or 8th Army. He had a difficult time with 2nd 
Division and got really smeared at Carpiquet. It wasn’t his fault that 
he had trouble with his brigade commanders -  he hadn’t had the 
division long. Foulkes and Simonds tolerated one another, though he 
thought Foulkes was envious of Simonds. Still, Foulkes was a better 
corps commander than a division commander.
Why did Foulkes rise despite all? Probably his seniority as a 
PFer who couldn’t be overlooked. Clearly Matthews couldn’t quite 
understand this -  others could have done better with 2nd Division, 
like [Brigadier Sherwood] Lett, and again he said Foulkes was 
unpopular up and down.
Harry Foster was a better brigadier than division commander, a 
tough fighter. He thought he didn’t enjoy being a division commander. 
But when Foster (or Vokes with whom he traded divisions) was on his 
flank they did all that was asked. (Later, in a telephone conversation 
on 14 May 1991, General Matthews said that he thought he’d been 
too harsh on Vokes and Foster. Both were good brigade commanders, 
and he was incorrect if he suggested they were a bit edgy as division 
commanders. He had no right to say that, and he’d served under 
Vokes for 7-8 months without difficulty.)
Holly Keefler was ambitious and able, though Matthews didn’t 
like the way he instantly adopted Highland dress when he took over 
3rd Division. He thought he looked down at others because of his 
education. Still he was a good brigade commander, and he got on 
well with him.
Dan Spry was dreadfully young -  about a month or two younger 
than Matthews! Their first action in Italy, when Spry got a brigade, 
had a complex plan requiring two barrages and a change of axis 
between. It didn’t work and Matthews as c r a  had to stop the barrage 
in mid-shoot, something never done. But Spry learned. Then the 
strain got too much, and he had to be relieved.
Matthews said he thought Canada, for political reasons, took on 
too much in the war. The country couldn’t support an Army, and we 
were always begging for assistance. It would have been better just to 
have two corps and serve under the UK.
On reinforcements : there were problems especially with French- 
Canadian units, but he didn’t seem to see them as darkly as Ottawa
19
: A Boy Seaman in the King’s Service William Miles, RNCVR
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
did. He had enough French to cope, and he could talk to the French­
speaking units (two battalions and one medium regiment) in 2nd 
Division. He got on well with them. Still, he had to put anglophone 
officers into the Maisonneuves, officers who couldn’t speak French. He 
blamed our making too many commitments for the [officer shortage] 
crisis, though he didn’t criticize [Defence Minister J. Layton] Ralston 
who worked hard.
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